

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

August 14, 1972

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

NSA review  
completed

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Our Strategy Towards Egypt

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

On my earlier memorandum on the Egyptian expulsion of the Soviets (Tab A) you noted the reports that the Egyptians do not want to wait until the November elections for the US to seize this "new opportunity."

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As you know, in late July the Egyptians approached us

However, we made clear that we would not accept preconditions. Our approach in these talks would be as follows: In all the previously successful negotiations conducted at the Presidential level, we did not go into detailed substantive negotiation until we had already achieved a preliminary understanding on the direction and general principles that the outcome would follow. In this case we insisted to the Egyptians that we talk initially about what was realistically achievable. This was the essence of the matter and the only justification for the direct involvement of the President.

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We have received many reports that Sadat does not want to wait until November. But we have offered him preliminary talks by late September, and we cannot conduct these talks under any groundrules other than the above. The alternative of military action will be suicidal for him. The Israelis plan to behave scrupulously and give him no pretext for such action.

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MEMORANDUM

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July 25, 1972 ✓

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Developments in Cairo and Reflections

It is still too early to know exactly how profound a change in the Egyptian-Soviet relationship will evolve from this week's important developments. However, the following hypothesis may be worth stating as a basis for testing in the light of further developments:

Sadat has been under increasing pressure in Cairo because of frustration over lack of movement toward an Egyptian-Israeli settlement and domestic stagnation. The US-USSR summit coupled with general lack of Soviet support for a military solution brought home to him that a settlement on Egyptian terms was not a top priority issue for Moscow. He decided to take a bold step that would respond to domestic nationalistic sentiment, cause Moscow to think harder about Cairo's problems and introduce change into the "frozen" situation, perhaps encouraging the US to see a new opportunity. Given earlier indications that he expects no real movement involving the US until November, he may generally have wanted a dramatic change to carry through the next six months or have hoped even to produce some movement. This, of course, is speculation. The main developments in the last twenty-four hours are below:

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*HK - What are we doing to keep  
Sadat from acting before November?*

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--Egypt's main objective remains the return of its territory lost in 1967. President Nasser brought in the Soviet military advisory program in 1970 as the only possible response to Israeli deep penetration air attacks on Egypt. The air defense system built as a result remains with enough Egyptian personnel to be capable of increasing the cost to Israel of any renewed attack. Despite that gain, the Soviet military advisory program was costing Egypt money, was criticized within Egypt and most important of all was not contributing to the main goal of recovering the lost territory. The program had become a liability and was no longer serving Egyptian interest.

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2. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ghaleb asked the head of our Interests Section for answers on how the US intends to proceed on five issues: "proximity" talks on an interim settlement; further US-Soviet discussions; Four Power talks; the reactivation of Jarring as mentioned in the Moscow communique; and how the US views the overall context. At the same time, Ambassador Bush has been approached by the Egyptian representative to the UN urging that the five permanent members of the Security Council support the reactivation of the Jarring mission.

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I shall be discussing with you separately the matter of developing a reply to the Egyptians and a strategy for the next six months.

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